[Article] The Philosophical Implications of Sense Realism

A Response to Daniel Wagner James D. Capehart, Ph.D. Sacred Heart Apostolic School Rolling Prairie, IN [response to daniel wagner, “the logical terms of sense realism”] Download Issue Version PDF In his essay “The Logical Terms of Sense Realism: A Thomistic-Aristotelian and Phenomenological Defense” Daniel Wagner addresses the problem of universals and specifically the problem… Read More [Article] The Philosophical Implications of Sense Realism

[Article] Aquinas On Suppositum, Essence & Universals

  Seth Kreeger PhD Candidate Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology [online only response to daniel wagner, “the logical terms of sense realism”] Download as PDF Having read “The Logical Terms of Sense Realism: A Thomistic-Aristotelian & Phenomenological Defense” I find myself to be quite in agreement with Professor Wagner about the impossibility of nominalism… Read More [Article] Aquinas On Suppositum, Essence & Universals

[Article] The Logical Terms of Sense Realism

A Thomistic-Aristotelian & Phenomenological Defense Daniel C. Wagner Professor and Chair of Philosophy Aquinas College, Grand Rapids, MI Editor, Reality ABSTRACT: At the heart of realist philosophy is the doctrine of univocal predication of definitions or the universal terms genus, species, and difference. This doctrine, first set down by Aristotle in the Categories, was famously… Read More [Article] The Logical Terms of Sense Realism

[review] What Love Is

“Romantic love”, Carrie Jenkins writes near the end of her book, “cannot continue to be something we just stumble into and accept.”  This is true and good advice, and Jenkins’ book—which spans a prologue, introduction, seven chapters, and a conclusion—successfully instigates a questioning after the truth of what romantic love is or ought to be.  The implication, however, that there might be other things—our politics, our careers, our religious beliefs—into which we, having stumbled into them, can or ought to accept unquestioningly, is itself highly questionable.  Indeed, I will argue that many of the presuppositions on which Jenkins builds the argument of What Love Is appear accepted without question.  As we intend to show here, these unexamined presuppositions, when exposed, result in Jenkins’ argument falling apart—or, perhaps to continue the metaphor, turn a stumble into a precipitous fall.… Read More [review] What Love Is

[article] Interpretation and Traditions

ABSTRACT: My topic today develops some themes found or at least suggested in both Ens Primum Cognitum and The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology but focuses on one in particular: namely, why people are so quick to develop and obstinate in maintaining bad intellectual positions—not in terms of the historical causes which have contributed to the state of bad thinking prevalent today, but in terms of the cognitive capacities themselves; that is, what happens in the person as cognitive agent when falsehoods are adopted and subsequently protected.… Read More [article] Interpretation and Traditions