Seth Kreeger PhD Candidate Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology [online only response to daniel wagner, “the logical terms of sense realism”] Download as PDF Having read “The Logical Terms of Sense Realism: A Thomistic-Aristotelian & Phenomenological Defense” I find myself to be quite in agreement with Professor Wagner about the impossibility of nominalism… Read More [Article] Aquinas On Suppositum, Essence & Universals
Reflections in Response to Brian Kemple Matthew K. Minerd, Ph.D. Byzantine Catholic Seminary of Ss. Cyril and Methodius Pittsburgh, PA ABSTRACT: I have been asked to write a response to Dr. Brian Kemple’s essay, “Signs and Reality: An Advocation for Semiotic Realism.” What follows will be a kind of “rough and ready critical glance” over… Read More [Article] The Analogy of Res-ality
A Thomistic-Aristotelian & Phenomenological Defense Daniel C. Wagner Professor and Chair of Philosophy Aquinas College, Grand Rapids, MI Editor, Reality ABSTRACT: At the heart of realist philosophy is the doctrine of univocal predication of definitions or the universal terms genus, species, and difference. This doctrine, first set down by Aristotle in the Categories, was famously… Read More [Article] The Logical Terms of Sense Realism
“Romantic love”, Carrie Jenkins writes near the end of her book, “cannot continue to be something we just stumble into and accept.” This is true and good advice, and Jenkins’ book—which spans a prologue, introduction, seven chapters, and a conclusion—successfully instigates a questioning after the truth of what romantic love is or ought to be. The implication, however, that there might be other things—our politics, our careers, our religious beliefs—into which we, having stumbled into them, can or ought to accept unquestioningly, is itself highly questionable. Indeed, I will argue that many of the presuppositions on which Jenkins builds the argument of What Love Is appear accepted without question. As we intend to show here, these unexamined presuppositions, when exposed, result in Jenkins’ argument falling apart—or, perhaps to continue the metaphor, turn a stumble into a precipitous fall.… Read More [review] What Love Is
In this response to Francisco Plaza’s paper, I have two primary aims. First, to highlight and further explore Plaza’s critique of what I will call the “content” that makes up modern thought, especially as it relates to certain broader cultural movements in the Western world. Second, to provide…… Read More [article] Classical Realism in a Democratic Context
A review of Kate Manne’s Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (Oxford University Press: New York, 2018).… Read More [review] Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny
How do we confront evil? There is no easy solution to this problem; but we learn much from a literary investigation, if we have the eyes to see what great thinkers like Jacques Maritain and Fyodor Dostoevsky have to tell us.… Read More [essay] Dostoevsky and the Cry of Rachel
How does truth admit of more or less? The same applies to nobility and being. One might also ask, just what does Thomas means by nobility? How is it distinct from goodness? How is the maximum in any genus supposed to cause everything else in that genus? Is this formal or efficient causality? Is this a Neo-Platonic argument from participation? Is the argument undermined by the Angelic Doctor’s outdated and erroneous example of fire as cause of all heat? Each issue is likely deserving of its own paper. Yet behind all these questions (except, perhaps, the meaning of nobility), lies a more primary difficulty: the meanings of “more or less” and the “maximum” by which they are denominated. How we answer the above questions depends on our understanding of these two key features of the argument.… Read More [essay] Participation and the Divine
REALITY 
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